The Political Economy of Agricultural Transition by Swinnen, Johan F.M.
*IATRC
INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
TRADE RESEARCH  CONSORTIUM
Economic Transition in Central and East Europe,
and the Former Soviet  Union:
Implications for International Agricultural Trade
Von Witzke,  H. and S. Tangermann,  eds.
1998
International Agricultural Trade  Research Consortium
Symposium Proceedings Issue
June 12-14,  1997
Berlin,  GermanyTHE POLITICAL ECONOMY  OF AGRICULTURAL  TRANSITION
Johan F.M.  SWINNEN  1
University of Leuven, Belgium
INTRODUCTION
The paper analyzes four aspects of the political economy of agricultural  transition  in
Central  and  Eastern  European  countries (CEECs):  (1) agricultural  price  distortions,
(2)  the choice of protection  instruments,  (3)  land  reform  and  privatization,  and  (4)
farm restructuring  and decollectivization.
POLITICAL ECONOMY  OF AGRICULTURAL  PRICE  DISTORTIONS
Three  Phases  of CEEC  Agricultural Policy Development  During Transition
One  can  distinguish  three  phases  since  the  start,  in  1989,  of the  liberalization  of
price and trade policies in the CEEC  agro-food sector.  In the first phase, prices and
trade  regimes  were  liberalized and  subsidies abolished.  Consumer  prices  soared,
real incomes often declined,  and domestic demand fell.  Foreign market access  had
been  reduced  as  the  traditional  agricultural  export  markets  in  the  former  Soviet
Union  dwindled  because  of  lack  of  hard  currency  and  as  the  Western  countries
remained  closed  for  CEEC  agricultural  exports.  Farm  input  prices  increased
strongly relative to producer prices, causing  a strong decline  in  agricultural  terms of
trade and demands for government  support.
In  a  second  phase,  price  and  trade  interventions  were  (re-)introduced  to  support
agricultural  producers  and/or  consumers  on  an  ad  hoc  basis,  adding  to  the
uncertainty  induced  by  general  economic  reforms.  The  government  and  its
administration was  not experienced  in  implementing  policies in the emerging  market
economy.  Governments reacted  to unanticipated  policy effects by introducing  more
ad  hoc  regulations.  Agricultural  policy  making  had  the  characteristics  of  a  "fire
brigade"  (OECD,  1993).
In  a  third  stage,  CEEC  governments  moved  to formulating  a  comprehensive  set of
agricultural policies for long  term  intervention  in agriculture.  Some  CEECs  installed
a policy instrumentarium  that resembles the EU's  Common  Agricultural  Policy (CAP)
prior  to  the  MacSharry  reforms.  Such  "CAP-style"  agricultural  policy  packages
include guaranteed prices, production quotas, (variable) export subsidies and import
levies.
The  emergence  of these  policy  regimes  has  been  explained  as  being  part  of  the
CEECs'  strategy  for  EU-membership:  creating  an  agricultural  policy  that  is
consistent  with  the  EU's  CAP.  In  Swinnen  (1993,  1996),  I  argued  that  this
1 Research  for this  paper has been financially  supported  by the Belgian  National  Scientific Research
Foundation  (NFWO)  and. the EU  COST and FAIR programs.  The author is grateful to Stefan  Bojnec,
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71integration-strategy  is  not  the  main  reason  for  the  re-emergence  of  interventionist
policies  in  the  CEEC  agro-food  sector,  but  that  the  main  cause  is  the  domestic
political  economy.  Government  interventions  and  regulations  of  agricultural
commodity  markets  in  CEECs  are  to  an  important  extent  determined  by  the
structural  characteristics  and  economic  performance  of  their  producers  and
consumers.
Political  Economy  of Transition  Price Distortions
Figure  1 shows  how  average  price  distortions  (measured  by  real  protection  rates
(RPRs))  in seven CEECs declined significantly in 1991  and 1992 as a result of price
and  trade  liberalization.  In  1993,  the  level  of protection  increased  again  as  many
CEECs  introduced protectionist price and trade policy measures.  In  1994 and  1995,
the average  level of protection  in the  region first stabilized and  then  aligned  closer
to  the  world  market  prices.  The  level  of  protection  differs  substantially  between
Central and East European  countries and commodities (Bojnec and Swinnen,  1997).
1993 and 1994 RPRs are very high in Slovenia (up to 80%),  between 20 and 30% in
Hungary, and between -4% and +15%  in the Czech  Republic,  Slovakia and  Poland.
In  Bulgaria  RPRs  are  considerably  below 0.  In  most  CEECs  there  are  important
differences  between  products.  For  example,  1994  Hungarian  RPRs  are  much
higher  for  milk  (70%)  and  for  imported  products  (48%)  than  for  exports  (12%).
Finally,  exchange  rate  adjustments  have,  in  general,  not  followed  inflation  rate
differences  between  countries.  It  is  unclear  to  what  extent  this  development  is
policy-induced (Bojnec,  Minch and Swinnen,  1997),  but the resulting  impact on farm
incomes acts as a tax on agriculture,  reflected in declining ExPRs  in  figure  1, similar
to that observed by Krueger,  Schiff and Valdes (1989)  in developing countries.
Political economy theory2 of agricultural  protection  predicts that producer  protection
increases when producer income falls relative to incomes in the rest of the economy
and  when  the  costs  of  protection  imposed  on  the  rest  of  society  (budget
expenditures,  consumer  expenditures  or  inflation)  decline  (Anderson,  1994;  de
Gorter  and  Tsur,  1991;  Swinnen,  1994a).  Swinnen  (1996)  shows  that  these
predictions  are consistent with available  CEEC  data.3  A  negative  correlation  exists
between  average  RPRs  and  the  share  of food  in  total  consumer  expenditures  in
CEECs.  Slovenia and  Hungary,  where  consumers  spend  less  than  30%  on  food,
have a considerably higher RPR than other CEECs  where consumers spend more of
their  income  on  food.  There  is  also  a  negative  correlation  between  the  share  of
agriculture  in  total  employment  and  the  RPRs,  but  Slovenia  and  Poland  have
considerably higher protection  rates  than predicted  by this relationship.  This,  and
2 The  "new political economy" or "endogenous policy theory" has its roots in the public choice
literature.  Applications of this theory to agriculture have attempted to explain the shift in agricultural
policies that occurs throughout economic development (see Swinnen and van der Zee (1993) for a
survey).
3  While CEECs started from a very different political system, the new political institutions and the
emergence  of new and better organized  opposition  parties makes this analytical  framework
increasingly  relevant and  applicable  to CEEC decision-making  on agricultural  and food policies as the
transition progresses.  CEEC govemrnments  increasingly have to adjust policies to accomodate the
reform impacts on different groups in society.  Policy changes in agricultural  policies increasingly
reflect changes  in  producers',  consumers'  and taxpayers'  political  reactions, rather than  party
preferences.  As such, CEEC agricultural policy-making  increasingly  reflects  patterns that underly
agricultural  policies in Western  democracies.
72other evidence  on  agricultural  credit  subsidies  (Swinnen,  Gow  and  Hartell,  1998),
suggests that when  small-scale private  farmers  dominate  in  agriculture  (such  as  in
Slovenia  and  in  Poland),  the  political  influence  of  farmers  increases,  either  for
political reasons (reform-minded  governments may be more willing to support private
agriculture than to subsidize collective agriculture4), or because  political-institutional
factors  make  small-scale  private  farms  more  influential  (Hagedorn,  1992),  or
because of their low comparative advantage (relative income factor).
Future  Policy Developments
Most CEECs  have experienced economic growth  in  recent years, which  is  predicted
to continue  in the next years (OECD).  As the  economy grows,  a number  of effects
occur  simultaneously,  some  with  opposite  effects  upon  government  policy
incentives.  Table  1 summarizes these  effects.  On  aggregate,  our theory  predicts
domestic  factors  to  increase  political  incentives for  agricultural  protection  in  the
medium-to-long  run. 5  First,  there  is  much  uncertainty  about  the  comparative
advantage  of  CEEC  agriculture.  While  agriculture  may  be  the  most  promising
source  of  output  growth  in  the  short-to-medium  term,  in  the  medium-to-long  run,
CEEC  comparative  advantage  should  gradually  move  towards  standard
manufactures  (Anderson,  1993).  In  the  medium-to-long  run,  one  should  therefore
expect  that  the  relative  income  factor  will  stimulate  an  increase  in  agricultural
protection.  However,  with  major  differences  between  the  CEECs  and  various
agricultural  subsectors,  both  in  terms  of  comparative  advantage  and  general
economic  development,  one  should  be  careful  to  disaggregate  this  analysis  for
predictive  purposes.  Second,  with  economic  growth  domestic  demand  for  more
income elastic products increases in the short-to-medium  run, but  in the longer term,
demand  for food becomes increasingly less elastic,  resulting  in  a negative  pressure
on  agricultural  incomes.  Further,  food expenditure  shares  decline,  and  within  food
products expenditures  shift away from staple foods,  reducing  consumer  resistance,
partially  offset  by  improvements  in  food  processing  and  distribution.  Third,
economic  growth  increases  employment  opportunities  in  the  non-farm  sector  for
farm  labour  and  investments  in  rural  infrastructure  and communications,  increasing
labour  mobility  and  reducing  the  political  demand  for  protection.  Fourth,  farm
numbers  decline  with  economic  growth  but  agricultural  becomes  more  capital
intensive.  This  increases  the  'vested  interest'  and  the  political  sensitivity.  In
combination  with  reduced  negative  impacts  of food  price  increases  on  wages  and
industrial  profits it  increases  incentives for protection.  Fifth,  privatization increases
the income sensitivity of agricultural labour and their political activity.
Therefore,  structural  change  in  the  medium-to-long  run  in  CEECs  will  increase
domestic  pressures  in  favour  of  agricultural  protectionism  and  reduce  opposition
against  it.  This logic need not be  deterministic because other factors  affect  policy-
making,  including  the  institutional framework  of decision-making,  the  particularities
of farmers'  voting  behavior,  the  abilities  to  form  an  effective  interest  group,  etc.
However, empirical  evidence suggests that the factors discussed here do affect the
4  However,  one should also take into account that by  1994 in  several  CEECs former Communists
were  back in goverment.
5  See Swinnen  (1996)  for an extensive discussion.
73constraints on  policy  makers.  It  is therefore  important  to  realize  that the  change  in
political incentives for governments  is  real.  Ignoring these developments  and these
patterns  and  attributing  sub-optimal  policy-making  to  ignorance  of  politicians  or
consumers  or  to  some  exogenously  assumed  control  of  farm  lobbies  over
governments  will  be  counterproductive  (de  Gorter  and  Swinnen,  1994).  When
governments  responses  to  incentives  and  policies  are  at  least  to  some  extent
endogenous,  useful  policy recommendations  focus  on  changing  the  incentives  for
politicians and governments  by e.g.  changing the institutional  environment  (Persson
and Tabellini, 1990).
The  most  effective  and  most  credible  constraint  on  incentives  to  increase  future
CEEC  agricultural  protectionism  are  international  agreements,  such  as  GATT,
CEFTA  and the EU's  integration strategy.  Such agreements  improve  credibility  and
political  acceptibility  of  trade  policies  which  diverge  from  the  short-run  political
optimum  (Giavazzi  and  Pagano,  1988).  By  tying  the  governments'  hands,  such
institutional  arrangements  reduce  the  government's  policy  choice  set  and  alter  its
incentives  in  decision-making.  The  announcement  of  a  future  CEFTA  and  EU
market  based  on  world  market  prices  for  agricultural  products  could  provide  a
credible  target  for  CEEC  policy-makers  and  increase  the  political  acceptability  in
CEECs of shifts in consumer and producer prices to world market levels.  Part of the
acceptability would result from the implicit compensation scheme  in  EU accession.
POLITICAL ECONOMY  OF POLICY INSTRUMENT  CHOICE
Patterns of Agricultural Policy Instrument Choice
Table 2 summarizes the changes  in agricultural  price and trade  policy instruments  in
CEECs since 1990.  The stylized facts are (Hartell and Swinnen,  1998):
*  After  broad  liberalization  and  subsidy cuts,  the  main  instrument  left  was  import
tariffs.
*  Gradually,  a series  of non-tariff  interventions  emerged  to protect  producers  and
agricultural protection increases following declining terms  of trade.
*  In  the  Visegrad-4  countries,  non-tariff  interventions  evolved  into  a  market
organization  system  implemented  to  provide  long  run  support  to,  and  interventions
in, agriculture  (incl. variable  import  levies in combination  with minimum  guaranteed
producer prices, mostly used in  the  milk, wheat,  sugar and  beef subsectors).
*  Production  controls  have  been  installed  only  after  price  support  policies  were
implemented,  and  in  the milk and  sugar subsector only.
*  Quantitative  export  restraints  have  been  used  nearly  permanently  in Bulgaria
and Romania,  and  intermittently elsewhere  -- especially in  cereals  markets.
*  Policy  instruments  became  increasingly distortive and  interventionist, but  GATT
regulation implementation  has converted variable import levies into tariffs.
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instruments  as described  above are offered  in the literature:  the  'looking  across  the
fence'  explanation,  and  a  political  economy  interpretation.  The  first  explanation
includes  the widely  held view  that  presumes  CEEC  governments  chose  protection
levels and policy instruments that would minimise adjustment costs at the time  of EU
accession.  It  is not surprising,  in this view,  that  CEEC  policy has  developed  in  the
direction  of  the  EU's  CAP.  The  political  economy  explanation  focuses  on  the
distribution  of  costs  and  benefits  of various  policy  instruments  and  on  how  they
affect  the  behaviour  of  agents  trying  to  influence  government  decision-making.
Changes  in  CEEC  political  institutions  and  in  structural  conditions  of  their
economies  induce  changes  in  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  use  of  various  policy
instruments, yielding the policy patterns as observed above  as the politically  optimal
instrument choices in  the domestic political economy  game.  External  factors  play a
role through the constraints they impose  on the government choice  set and through
their  impact  on  the  structural  conditions.  We  first discuss  the  political  economy
explanation  and  afterwards  discuss additional  insights from  the  'looking  across  the
fence' model.
Political Economy  of Policy Instrument Choice
Most political economy studies of agricultural policy have focused  on explaining  the
level  of  price  and  trade  policy  intervention  and  less  attention  is  paid  to  the
explanation of the  instruments  used for intervention.  This  is  remarkable  because  it
is quite obvious that the distortionary effects of government  interventions  are equally
dependent  on  the  choice  of  the  instrument  as  on  the  level  of  the  intervention.
Moreover,  there  is  a  remarkable  conflict  between  policy  prescripts  by  economists
and  observations  on  actual  policies  not  only  regarding  the  level  of  policy
interventions,  but also regarding  the  instruments used.  For example,  Rodrik  (1986)
writes that the  observed  use  of policy instruments for trade  and  price  interventions
are almost the inverse of their ranking in terms of economic optimality.
The  most  important  political  economy  explanations  of  instrument  choice  can  be
grouped  into four categories (De  Nolf and Swinnen,  1997):
1.  The  imperfect information  (or "Virginia"-school)  approach  which focuses on  how
differences  in  information  of  various  interest  groups  affects  their  preference  for
certain policies.  This approach includes the "obfuscation" explanation which argues
that governments use policies which obfuscate the costs of the policies to those hurt
by the policies (Magee, Brock and Young, 1989).  The obfuscation argument is often
used  to explain  the  persistence of  agricultural  price  supports  and  tariffs  in  OECD
countries.
2.  The obfuscation argument  is refuted  by the efficient redistribution  (or "Chicago"-
school)  approach  which  argues  that  competition  among  pressure  groups  favours
efficient instruments of redistribution.  'Seemingly  inefficient instruments' will turn out
efficient if all costs and benefits are taken into account (Stigler, 1971;  Becker,  1983;
Gardner, 1983).
3.  Another reason why 'seemingly  inefficient policies' may be efficient is to consider
them  as  compensation  instruments  in  a  larger  political  economy  framework.  This
logic fits into the "Berkeley-school"  argument of joint policy analysis (Rausser,  1992;
de Gorter, Nielson and Rausser,  1992).  Foster and  Rausser (1993)  show how  price
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need to compensate a minimum  blocking coalition from  vetoing efficiency-enhancing
government  policies.
4.  The  transaction costs  approach  argues  that  standard  analyses  of  policy
instrument  effects  ignore  costs  involved  in  the  implementation,  administration  and
enforcement of the policies,  and that this shortcoming  leads  to substantial  biases  in
the  implications  of  the  literature  (e.g.  Coase,  1960,  1989).6  Interestingly,  the
existence of transaction  costs  has  been used  both  to  defend  and  to  disapprove  of
the use  of existing  distortionary transfer  policies.  Coase  concludes  that  by  ignoring
transaction  costs  most  studies  underestimate  the  costs  of  government  policy  and
that  existing  policies  are  even  more  inefficient than  usually  argued.  In  contrast,
Munk  (1994)  argues  that  including  transaction  costs  in  the  analysis  leads  to  the
conclusion  that  existing  farm  policies  are  the  most  efficient  policies  effectively
available (and thus should be supported).
De Nolf and Swinnen  (1997)  propose  a two-stage  political economy model  in  which
governments  choose  policy  instruments  to  maximize  some  personal  objective
function,  but are constrained  in their choice by (1) external  institutions  (international
agreements,  IMF  conditions,  etc.),  (2)  imperfect  information  on  future  market
conditions,  and (3)  the  need to secure  sufficient political support  in  order to  stay in
power.  In  the first stage,  governments  choose  a political  economic  optimal  policy
level, and in the second stage they choose the policy instrument (as in  Rodrik,  1986;
Cassing  and  Hillman,  1985,  Campos,  1989).  With  sufficient  competition  between
political  agents  this  model  implies  that  governments  will  select  a  policy  which
minimizes  the  sum  of transaction  costs  deadweight  costs  of  market  and  taxation
distortions.  De  Nolf and  Swinnen  show how this model  can provide  an explanation
for the widely observed  phenomena  of path-dependency in  policy  instrument  choice
and  the persistence  of 'inefficient'  policy instruments.  The  model's  predictions  are
consistent with observed long run instrument  choice patterns  in  Western Europe.
A  Political  Economy  Explanation  of  CEEC  Agricultural  Policy  Instrument
Choice
Hartell  and Swinnen  (1997)  apply this model  to the specific circumstances  of CEEC
transition  to  explain  agricultural  policy  instrument  choice  during  CEEC  transition.
Conclusions from their analysis are the following:
*  Why were early interventions termed "ad hoc" or "stop gap" policy-making?
Liberalization and reforms significantly reduced the ability of governments to directly
intervene  in  production  and  consumption.  Governments,  and  the  administrations
they  relied  upon  for  implementing  policies, were  inexperienced  in  dealing  with  the
emerging  market  environment  which  incorporated  many  unknown  characteristics.
Previous  administrative  skills and  understanding  of  policy  effects  in  a command
economy  were  inadequate  in  the  new  market  environment  which  resulted  in  the
implementation  and  reversal  of  policies  when  they  produced  unanticipated  and
unwanted  effects.  This  human  capital constraint was a  key factor  in the "stop gap"
nature  of  policy  making  when  governments  were  "learning-by-doing"  in  a  new
economic environment.
6 Coase (1989)  refers to economic  analyses that exclude transaction  and administration  costs as
"blackboard  economics" which has relevance only in  the classroom but not  in the  real world.
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support (instead of more direct means of support to agricultural producers)?
Three  factors  are  important.  First,  tariff administration  probably  involves  the  least
amount  of  immediate  transaction  costs  compared  to  other  instruments  given  the
level  of  transfers.  Secondly,  deadweight  allocative  distortions  and  leakages
typically become  more  important  in the long  run.  Discounting  of future  costs versus
immediate  benefits  may  play  an  important  role,  especially  in  an  uncertain  market
environment.  When  there  is  uncertainty whether  the need  for  support  is  temporary
or  there  is  a  need  for  more  structural  interventions,  policy-makers'  incentives  will
induce  them  to  choose  the  instrument  with  the  lowest  total  investment  costs  (i.e.
sunk costs of setting  up the policy implementation),  because  these  investments  are
lost  if there  is  only  a  temporary  need  for  support.  Third,  human  capital  in  policy-
making  limitations  may  have  temporarily  precluded  the  use  of  more  sophisticated
and unfamiliar instruments.
In  conclusion,  the  trade-off  among  competing  distortions  in  an  uncertain  market
environment,  with  a  government  facing strong  pressures  for immediate  results  and
human  capital  constraints  in  policy  implementation,  is  in  favor  of  a  familar,  low
administrative cost instrument which generates immediate results:  a tariff.
*  Why  a  progression  from  tariffs  to  increasing  use  of quantitative restriction to
trade?
The initial transition was characterized by huge price and trade instability.  While the
domestic  reforms  were  an  important  cause  of  instability,  external  markets  caused
considerable  instability  as  well  --  taking  over  as  the  most  important  source  of
uncertainty  and  instability  as  transition  progressed.  This  was  due  to  the
combination  of the CMEA  collapse,  reforms  and their trade  effects  in  other  CEECs,
and non-CEEC  causes of world market  changes (e.g.  world  grain  price  increases  in
1995).  In  an  environment  characterized  by external  (world  market)  price  instability
of unknown magnitude  and duration, quantitative restrictions  are more effective  than
tariffs  in  securing  minimum  incomes  from  an  ex-ante  policy  decision  perspective
(Falvey  and  Lloyd,  1991).  The  use  of tariffs  cannot  guarantee  a  certain  domestic
price level with world market uncertainty.  Quantitative  restrictions can.  When  either
producer  incomes  were  heavily  pressured  by  increasing  imports,  or  when
consumers  reacted  strongly to  domestic  welfare  effects  of increasing  world  market
prices,  governments  preferred  quantitative  trade  restrictions.  Furthermore,  the
additional  transaction  costs  of  quantitative  trade  restrictions  were  relatively  small
compared  to  direct subsidies  as the  implementation  takes place  through  the  same
administration  as tariffs.
*  Why the near permanent nature of quantitative restrictions on exports in Bulgaria
and Romania, and intermittent use elsewhere?
Bulgaria and Romania are the poorest countries of the CEECs  analyzed here.  Their
governments faced continuous pressure from  consumers for low price food.  Again,
with external  price uncertainty, quantitative export restrictions provided most security
for  the  government  to  guarantee  a minimum  food  supply  and  at  certain  prices.
Some  other  CEEC  governments  also  introduced  grain  export  restrictions  in  1995
and  1996  when  rising  world  market  prices  for grains  induced  strong  grain  exports
and  thereby  threatened  grain  supplies  for  domestic  consumers.  With  rising
consumer unrest,  governments  found  it politically too  risky to rely on  export taxes  in
the face of uncertain world  market developments.
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Increases  in self-sufficiency (either due to trade policy induced  distortions  or due  to
recovery of production) will  depress domestic prices.  Export subsidies  can  then  be
used  to  implicitly  meet  the  desired  level  of  producer  support  by  clearing  the
domestic market of "surpluses".  However,  if there is uncertainty from one year to the
next  about  whether  the  country  will  be  a  net  exporter  or  a  net  importer,  export
subsidies  will  be  insufficient  to  remove  the  domestic  sources  of  price  instability.
Explicit price guarantees  provide an ex ante certainty of providing  the desired  level
of producer support.
For several  commodities,  the marginal  increase  in transaction costs associated  with
price guarantees  is smaller than the introduction of direct subsidies, especially  when
production  is  importantly  located  on  small(er)  farms  (as e.g.  in  Poland)  and  when
price  guarantees  can  be  administered  through  a  relatively  small  number  of
processing  centers.  The  marginal  reduction  in  deadweight  distortions  of  policy
reform  to  a less distorting  mechanism  is  not great  enough  to  offset  the  transaction
cost change,  especially when considering  the negative  effect  of taxation  distortions
implied in policy reform to more direct subsidies.
*  Why the emergence in some CEECs of production quotas for milk and sugar ?
The  argument  here  is essentially the  same  as for the  preceding  observation.  The
transaction costs of monitoring  compliance with  production quotas  is  relatively  lower
for  milk  and  sugar  because  of the  concentrated  nature  of  commodity  processing.
Transaction  costs  associated  with  a  farm  level  identification  and  monitoring  in
addition to  the costs  and distortions of substantially  increasing  tax  revenues favors
the use of production controls  until  the marginal reduction  in deadweight distortions
and leakages of a policy reform  become large.
EU  Accession and CEEC  Policy Decisions
Another explanation for the re-emergence of agricultural protection and the choice of
policies  is  that  CEEC  governments  have  copied  the  EU  example  to  minimize
adjustment costs at the time of accession.  In my view, the "looking across the fence"
explanation  is  not  an  alternative,  but  rather  an  addition  to  the  political  economy
model.  For example,  it  helps  to  explain why  CEEC  policy regimes  have  tended  to
become  more  pre-1992  CAP  - like  in  their  appearance  rather  than  like  US  farm
programmes.  However,  by itself, the view that  CEEC  governments have  sought to
imitate EU  institutions and  policies cannot explain  several  observations.
In particular,  the past impact  of  potential  EU  integration  on  transition  CEEC  price
and  trade  policy  choices  has  been  overemphasized  (Swinnen,  1993,  1996).
Regarding  the  level  of  protection,  the  limited  access  to  the  Western  markets  and
increased  competition  with  (partly  subsidized)  Western  food  products  on  Eastern
markets  has  increased  the  downward  pressure  on  agricultural  incomes  in CEECs.
As  depressed  farm  incomes  increase  demand  for  agricultural  protectionism  and
subsidization, limiting the EU  market access and  other protectionist policies, such as
export  subsidies, has  induced  policy  interventions  to  support the CEEC  agricultural
sectors.
78Also,  as  regards  the  choice  of  instruments,  the  alignment  factor  does  not  give  a
satisfactory  explanation  for several  observations.  For example,  EU  accession  was
an  important  issue  when  several  CEECs  were  still  sticking  to  free  trade  policies.
Also, the 1992 MacSharry reform  of the CAP  has not induced major following  among
the CEECs.  Instead,  CEECs'  agricultural policies resemble the pre-MacSharry  CAP
much  more  than  the  current  CAP.  Further,  it  cannot  explain  the  important
differences in both the level and the choice of policy instruments  in CEECs.
However,  as  EU  integration  is  now  increasingly  presented  as  a  credible
development  in the  medium term,  one should expect that the  EU-CEEC  agricultural
policy  alignment  factor  will  become  increasingly  important  in  future  CEEC
agricultural  policy-making.  Of  course,  much  will  depend  on  the  EU's  proposed
strategy for integration.  According  to  many studies (e.g.  Buckwell  et  al.  (1995)  and
Tangermann  and Josling (1995))  further  CAP  reform  will  be unavoidable  in the  light
of  CEEC  accession  and  GATT  commitments.  The  EU  Commission  has  also
emphasized  the  need  for  reform  in  its  Agenda  2000  proposals.  However,  there
remains  uncertainty  (a)  on  whether  the  Council  of  Ministers  will  accept  the
Commission's  view,  (b)  on the details of the reforms,  and  (c) on  the timing  and  the
implementation  of the reforms.  All these factors affect what the CAP will  look  like  at
the  time  of accession.  Before  this  information  is  available,  CEEC  policy  makers,
even  if  they  want  to  base  their  policy-strategy  on  minimizing  adjustment  costs  of
integration with the future CAP,  can only try to hit an (albeit slowly) moving target.
THE  POLITICAL ECONOMY  OF LAND REFORM
Efficiency and  Income  Distribution in Institutional Reform
A key part of the agricultural transition  is land  reform, and  more general  privatization
of property rights.  Much of the literature  on CEEC  land reform  has acknowledged  its
political  aspects  but focused  primarily  on  the  efficiency  effects.  My  own  research
has  emphasized  the  political  economy  issues  because  important  institutional
changes  in  land  contracting  in  the  past  in  various  parts  of  the  world  have  only
occurred  following  major  changes  in  (political)  incentives for  decision-makers  (de
Janvry,  1981;  Hayami,  1991). Bardhan  (1989)  and North  (1991)  also emphasize that
the question  of efficiency-improving  institutional  change cannot  really  be  separated
from  that  of  redistributive  institutional  change.7  Hence,  efficiency  improving
institutional change will  only be implemented  if that  is consistent with the underlying
distributional motives and political constraints.
Our  research  suggests  that  also  in CEECs  the  main  determinants  of  the  choice
between  various  land  reform  are  political,  institutional and  historical factors,  rather
7 Neo-classical  institutional economics  (NIE)  views institutions as emerging  endogenously  as a
solution to problems of limited  computational ability and to problems  of cooperation  in  situation of
transaction costs. Bardhan  (1989)  distinguishes between three theories  of endogenous  institutions:
the Marxist school, the neo-classical  institutional economics  school (which  he  refers to  as the Coase-
Demsetz-Alchian-Williamson-North  approach),  and the imperfect  information  school.  The imperfect
information  school  has focused  mostly on specific contract relations  (especially  in  credit,  land and
labor contracting).  Bardhan  (1989,  p.4-5)  argues, that while these theories  provide some  insights on
how existing  institutions  can be explained,  all three approaches are  equally murky  on the mechanism
through which  new institutions and  property rights emerge.
79than  economic  considerations.  The  implications  are  quite  important,  particularly
regarding policy advice on the functioning of land markets and tenure contracting.
Observations  on CEEC  Land  Reforms and  Agricultural Privatization
A  comparative  analysis  of  agricultural  privatization  and  land  reform  in  CEECs
indicates some general patterns (table 3):
*  Restitution  of farmland  to  former  owners  is  the  most  important  process  of  land
reform  (in  terms  of  share  of  total  agricultural  land)  in  the  CEECs.  Typically,  the
reform  laws  specify  that  former  owners  are  restituted  the  land  in  historical
boundaries,  if possible.  Otherwise they  receive property  rights  to  a plot  of  land  of
comparable  size  and  quality.  With  the  exception  of  Poland  and  Albania,  an
important  share  of farmland  is  restituted  to  its  former  owners  in  all  CEECs.  And
even  in  Albania  collective farmland  property  rights  have  been  restituted  to  former
owners  in some mountainous regions.
*  In  the  FSU  land  is  restituted  to  former  owners  in  the  Baltic  countries  only.
Russia  and  Ukraine  distribute  land  in  two  forms.  The  most  important  form  is  the
distribution of collective and state farmland equally per capita among  collective farm
members  or state farm employees  in the form of paper shares or certificates.8
*  There  is  an  important  difference  in  land  reform  procedures  between  collective
farmland  and state farmland  in  CEECs,  but not in  the  FSU  countries.  In the  latter,
collective  and  state  farmland  are  treated  the  same  in  the  reforms.  In  CEECs,
collective  farmland  is  mostly  restituted  to  former  owners,  while  state  farmland is
mostly leased,  pending sale of the land.
*  Whereas  land  has  mostly been  restituted in-kind, this  has  not been  the general
rule for other assets.  Non-land assets have been restituted in some countries, but in
many cases were privatized using vouchers that could be turned  into  capital shares
in the new cooperative farm  or used for purchasing non-land assets for private use.
*  Privatization  and  land  reform  have not always  caused  a full  transfer  of effective
property  rights  to  the  new  (private)  owners,  for  three  reasons:  the  inherent
incomplete  transfer  under  some  of  the  privatization  policies,  imperfections  and
obstructions  at  the  policy  implementation  level,  and  legal  initiatives  limiting  the
effective transfer of  property  rights.  In other  words,  post-reform  effective  property
rights are only partially determined by privatization and land reforms.
These observations are  remarkable  for several  reasons,  most  importantly  because
of  their  conflict  with  economic  policy  advice  and  expectations.  Few  economists
would  have advised restituting land to former owners, or would  have advised using
8 The distribution of land shares does not imply physical allocation of land plots corresponding to the
shares.  Despite the  allocation  of land  shares to the members,  the land  remains  in joint  cultivation
pending further restructuring  decision  by the 'shareowners'.  A shareowner who wishes to establish  an
independent  farming operation  (individually or with  a group of coworkers)  is,  in  principle,  entitled to
receive from the collective farm  a physical  plot of land corresponding to the land  share (Lerman,
1997).
80different  and  sometimes  conflicting  procedures  for  non-land  assets  and  for  land.
The obvious question  is: why these reform  choices?
Determinants  of Privatization and  Land Reform  Procedures
Determinants  of the  choice  of the  privatization  and  land  reform  policies  in  CEECs
are (1) the  post-collectivization asset ownership  status,  (2) the  ethnicity  of the  pre-
collectivization  asset  ownership,  and  (3)  the  equality  of  pre-collectivization  asset
distribution and (4) economic efficiency (Swinnen,  1997).
*  The  single most important factor determining the privatization  policy choice  is the
legal  ownership  status  of  the  asset  at  the  outset  of  the  reforms:  all agricultural
assets  which were  still legally owned privately in  1989 have been restituted in  all
CEECs.  This factor is the main  reason why land  is generally treated differently than
non-land  assets  in  privatization.  The  principle  that  agricultural  assets  that  were
formally  still privately  owned are  restituted  to their formal  owners  contributes  to the
explanation  of  differences  between  CEECs,  (e.g.  in  Albania  all  land  was  state
owned);  of differences within CEECs  (e.g.  in Hungary part of the collective farm  land
was collectively owned);  of differences between  state farm land  and  collective farm
land; and of differences between  land and non-land assets.
*  The  most straightforward  effect of the  historical  legacy  of land  ownership  is  the
lack of demand for land restitution  in  large parts of the  FSU where  nearly  a century
of communist  rule  has wiped  out all  references  to private  individual  property  rights
(Lerman,  1997).
*  Ethnicity:  the  privatization  policy  choice  affects  the  distribution  of  asset
ownership between ethnic groups.  A general  observation  is that agricultural  assets
are not restituted to foreign former  owners.  This factor is important  in  explaining  the
difference between  the privatization of state farm  land  in Poland  (sales and  leasing)
and  in  Slovenia  (restitution),  with  both  countries  having  a  very  similar  pre-1989
agricultural  structure.  The  choice  of  the  privatization  process  also  affects  the
distribution  of  (agricultural)  assets  between  ethnic  groups  within  the  country.  An
example  of  where  the  privatization  choice  was  used  against  ethnic  minorities  is
privatization in the Baltics, where  restitution of land was chosen to allocate assets to
native citizens in the presence of large ethnic minorities.
*  Precollectivization  land  ownership  distribution  determines  the  conflict  between
historical  justice  and  social  equity.  In those  cases  where  governments  were  not
restricted  by  legal  ownership  rights,  they  have  typically  opted  for  equity  and
efficiency  over  historical  justice.  Their  motivation  was  a  combination  of  social,
economic and political objectives.
*  The stylized facts on  (non-restituted)  physical distribution of collective farm  and
versus  land  lease pending sale of state farm  land can  be explained by the fact that
the  costs  of  disruption  versus  the  benefits  of  land  use  security  were  lower  for
collective farm members than for state farm employees.
*  In  CEECs where  land  was  not  restituted  (Albania and  Hungary),  former  owners
were compensated  (non-agricultural  real estate  or compensation  vouchers).  In case
81of  land  restitution,  farm  workers  were  typically  compensated  through  of  a
combination of non-land  assets and restrictions on the  transfer of  property  rights  to
former  owners. The method  by which limitations  on the transfer of effective  property
rights  were  imposed  was  both  through  the  implementation  of  the  reforms,  and
through legal amendments  to the reform  legislation.
THE  POLITICAL ECONOMY  OF DECOLLECTIVIZATION
Observations on Decollectivization Policies
I define  the  "decollectivization  policy"  as the  set of  regulations  and  policies  which
were  intended  to  affect  the  transformation  of  the  collective and  state  farms.  Key
characteristics  of  the  decollectivization  policy  are  (a)  the  role  it allocates  for  the
management  of the collective and state farms,  and (b)  the incentives  it provides for
leaving  the  collective  farm.  In  general,  CEEC  governments  have  not  tried  to
increase the  disruption  of the  state  and  collective farms  beyond  what was  already
caused  by  the  privatization  policies.  Most  have  followed  a  transformation  policy
which  can  be  described  as  'neutral',  i.e.  intended  to  privatize  and  impose  hard
budget constraints on the entreprise,  but not to cause a  break-up  of the entreprise,
emphasizing  the need to minimize further disruptions. They have done so by  giving
the  members  and  management  an  important  role  in  the  transformation  of  their
collective and state farms.  For example,  in  both  Hungary and the  Czech  Republic,
former  management  were  the  main  agents  in  the  "transformation  boards"  of  the
collective farms which had to draw up a plan for transforming  the organization.
Some  (often  ex-Communist  Party)  governments  tried  to  conserve  the  large  scale
farms and used a decollectivization policy that made  it more difficult  for farm  workers
to  leave  and  withdraw  their  assets  for  starting  up  a  family  farm.  Individuals  are
discouraged to leave the collectives e.g.  by imposing on them  a share of the debt of
the  former  collective  form  and  high  administration  costs  or  by  complicating  the
contracting and use of assets if they want to leave and start up their own farm.
Only  in a few cases have governments  intentionally tried  to break-up  the  collective
and  state  farms  into  individual  farms,  and  supported  a  "radical"  decollectivization
policy.  For example, the 1992 UDF  government  in Bulgaria decided to throw out the
old  management  of  the  collective  farms  and  replaced  it  by  special  institutions  to
effectively liquidate the  collective farms,  appropriately called  "Liquidation  Councils"
(Swinnen,  1994b).  Similarly, the 1991  Sajudis government  in Lithuania removed  the
existing management from  its controlling positions and created  new institutions, the
Municipal Agrarian  Reform  Services, chaired  by outsiders  (Rabinowicz,  1997).  Not
surprisingly, in  both countries the role and the composition  of these  institutions was
changed when the ex-Communists came back to power.
The Political Economy of Decollectivization Policies
Why  have  some  governments  pursued  a  more  radical  decollectivization  program?
The process of privatization and decollectivization affects the distribution and use  of
asset endowments  in society.  Besides the direct income distributional  effects, there
is another set of political costs and  benefits which  affects the choice  of the agrarian
reform  strategy.  First,  the  asset distribution  affects  economic  interests  distribution,
82social  classes,  and  future  political  alignments.  Second,  it  affects  the  main
organizational  structure of the  rural  areas,  i.e.  the collective farms,  which  were  the
base for the ex-Communist  Party advantages  in political organization  for  mobilizing
and  influencing the  rural  electorate.  Finally,  the  process  also  affects  the  ability  of
the former  management  to  influence the  reform  implementation.  Therefore,  a  key
motivation for reformers'  governments to choose a radical decollectivization  policy  is
because (a)  it damages the organizational  structure from  which the ex-CP  has been
deriving its remarkable  electoral  strength;  (b)  it creates a  long term  political  support
base  for  the  reforms,  and  (c)  it  removes  the  nomenklatura  from  key  positions  to
block  the  implementation  of  the  reforms.  The  main  disadvantage  of  this  policy
option  is  the  high  political  costs  of  radical  decollectivization  due  to  the  induced
disruptions.  The  question  is,  then,  under which  circumstances the  gains outweigh
the costs for reformers'  governments.
The  political  importance  of the fact that (ex-)  Communist  parties  continue  to  obtain
much  support  in the  rural  areas depends  on  the overall  strength  of the  Communist
party and on that of the reformers.  If the reformers  are supported  by a large majority
or  if they  feel  that  the  democratic  political  regime  and  the  market  economy  are
"relatively safe",  they may feel less threathened by a continued  support  base for the
(ex-)Communists.  However,  if  this  is  not  the  case,  and  if such  a  support  base
preserves  a continuing  threat  for a "communist  revival"  which  could  undo many  of
the  political  and  economic  reforms,  the  reformers  will  be  more  inclined  towards  a
strategy  to  reduce  this  support  base.  The  motivation  to  create  a  long-run  anti-
Communist  and pro-reform  political support base  is therefore  more  likely  to  play an
important  role  when  democratic  reforms  are  insecure,  when  Communist  support
remains strong, especially in the countryside,  and when  reformers  perceive a strong
link  between  Communist  support  and  collective  and  state  farm  production
organizations.  Our  empirical  evidence  is  consistent  with  this  hypothesis  and
indicates that  in  those CEECs  where  a reform-minded  center  has  been  strong  and
where  the  reforms  were  perceived  as  more  "secure",  more  moderate
decollectivization policies have been chosen.
Decollectivization and  Farm  Restructuring
After transformation  legislation was  enacted,  state and  collective  farms  have  been
transformed  into  a  wide  variety  of farm  organizations,  such  as  "private"  producer
cooperatives,  joint  stock  companies,  limited  liability  companies  and  (individual)
family farms.  Most CEECs now have a mix of these organizations,  but the mix varies
stongly between  CEECs. Table 4 presents a farm  individualization index (FII)  which
measures the increase  in  individual farm use of agricultural  land.  The current farm
structure  ranges  from  virtually  all  individual  farms  (smaller  than  5  hectares)  in
Albania to virtually all  large-scale cooperatives and farming  companies of more  than
100 hectares in Slovakia.
Large-scale  production  organizations still  dominate  agricultural  production  in many
CEECs.  Many  new  land  owners  lease  their  land  to  the  large-scale  successor
organizations  of the  collective  and  state farms.  In 1994,  they cultivated  more  than
two-thirds  of  the  total  agricultural  area  in  Hungary,  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia
and  most  FSU  countries.  The  main  exceptions  are  Poland  and  Slovenia,  where
83small-scale farming dominated  under the Communist  period,  and Albania,  Romania,
and the Baltics.
Impact of Policies on Decollectivization and  Farm  Restructuring
An  important question is  how  much effect these decollectivization policies  have  had
on  the  effective  decollectivization  or  farm  restructuring  in  general.  Mathijs  and
Swinnen  (1998)  show that  decollectivization policies  have  had  some  effect  on  the
resulting  farm  restructuring,  but  that  the  most  important  factors  affecting  farm
restructuring  are  land  reform  policies, the  pre-reform  technology  and productivity  of
the collective farm,  and the economic environment during  transition  (incl.  risk, terms
of trade,  and market  imperfections).
Pre-reform  productivity in agriculture has a negative impact on decollectivization  (fig.
2).  Countries  with  low pre-reform  productivity on collective farms,  such  as Albania,
have  a significantly higher degree of decollectivization than  those where  collective
farm  productivity  was  higher,  such  as  Hungary.  Productivity  is  related  with  the
technology and with labour intensity in production.  The break-up of labour intensive
farms  causes  less  efficiency  losses.  Hence,  the  costs  of  leaving  the  large-scale
farm and starting up a smaller scale family farm are less.
Declining  terms  of  trade  and  risk  have  a  negative  impact  on  decollectivization.
However,  there  are  no  consistent  data  to  calculate  this  impact.  Furthermore,
negative  terms  of  trade  and  risk  have  occurred  in  all  CEECs'  agriculture,  and
therefore cannot explain the variation in the DI.
Decollectivization  is  lowest  in  countries  that  have  restituted  land  to  outsiders  or
where  property  rights were  ill defined,  and highest where  land  property  rights were
clear  and  distributed  to  insiders.  For  example,  Albania  and  Romania  have  used
land  reform  policies  that  allocate  land  in  physical  boundaries  to  insiders,  i.e.,
collective farm  members  or state  farm  employees.  Albania  distributed  most  of the
land  to  farm  workers,  and  Romania  used  a  combination  of  restitution  and
distribution.  In contrast, the shift to  individual tenures  is  much  less in countries such
as  the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia,  where  much  land  was  restituted  to  former
owners who were no longer active in agriculture. The lack of clearly defined property
rights  is especially problematic  in the FSU  (excluding the Baltics  and Armenia)  and
hampers farm restructuring  in these countries.
Within CEECs,  farm decollectivization is especially low in  Slovakia and Hungary.  A
key reason  is that  both  countries  implemented  legislation that  increased  the  costs
for leaving the  collective farm  considerably more  than in  other CEECs.  In contrast,
the Baltic countries, and especially Latvia, implemented policies that stimulated  the
break-up  of  the  collective  farms  as  part  of  their  de-communization  and
independence strategy.
In general, farm decollectivization  is more  important where (1) more of the land  was
distributed  to farm  workers,  (2)  the  share  of agriculture  in  employment  is  high,  (3)
labour intensity  in agriculture  is higher, and (4) exit costs are low.  It is remarkable  to
see  how the two  countries  at the extremes  of the  spectrum  are  exactly opposite  in
these  three  factors.  Albania,  where  decollectivization  is  highest,  distributed  land,
84has a high share of agriculture in employment,  labour intensive farming,  and  low exit
costs  (Cungu  and  Swinnen,  1998).  Slovakia,  where  decollectivization  is  lowest,
restituted  land,  has  a  low  share  of  agriculture  in  employment,  a  capital  intensive
agriculture,  and high exit costs.
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88Table  1:  Impact  of  structural  changes  on  CEEC  government  incentives  to
increase  agricultural protection
Medium  Run  Long  Run
Impact of Changes in :
1.  Relative  Income (Comparative Advantage)  --  +
2.  Food  Consumption  Pattern  --  +
3.  Food  Expenditure  Share  +  +
4.  Factor Mobility  --  --
5.  Agric. Capital  Intensity  --  +
6.  Privatization  +  +
Aggregate  Effect  ?+
89Table  2:  Patterns of Trade  and  Price Policy in CEECs
Instrument  Commodity  Country  Date
1.  Import Tariffs  All  All  1990
2.  Non-Tariff Barriers
Removal  or substantial  Most  Poland  1990
reduction of import &  export  Most  Hungary  1991
NTBs.1  Most  Bulgaria  1991
Most  Romania  1991
Most  CSFR  1991
Reintroduction  of import  Most including  processed  Poland  1992
NTBs.  food, fruit juice, dairy
products.
Most ag/food  products &  Bulgaria  1992
some  inputs
Temperate zone  CSFR  1992
agricultural  products.
Grains, sugar.  Hungary  1992
Reintroduction of export  Important food com.  Czech  R.  1993
NTBs.2   Grains, oilseeds, poultry,  Poland  1992
bovine animals.
Grains, flour, seeds,  Bulgaria  1992
livestock,  Sunflower oil.
Grains, flour, sugar,  milk,  Romania  1992
animals.
Milling wheat, meat,  sugar.  Hungary  1992
Appearance  of Variable  Oilseeds,  sugar prod.,  CSFR  19924
Import Levies.3   wine,
live animals, beef,  poultry,
butter, starches.  Poland  19944
Meat,  milk products,
cereals,  eggs, etc.
3.  Credit Subsidies  Current  inputs, capital  All  See Table 4
Investment,  processing
and  Storage
3.  Minimum  and  Various commodities  Visegrad  1991
Guaranteed Prices via  See Table 4a  & 4b  Bulgaria  1992
Purchases and  Market  Price  Romania  1993
Support
4.  Export Subsidies  Various commodities  Poland  1990
See Table 5  Czech R.  1991
Hungary  1991
Slovak R.  1991
5.  Production Quotas  Sugar  Poland  1994
Milk  Slovak R.  19945
Milk  Hungary  1996
1  Includes  various  combinations  of  import  and  export  licensing  and  fees,  import  quotas,  global
quotas, monopolized importing  agencies, exchange rate manipulation,  etc.
2 Primarily  permits  and  fees  but  also  licenses,  taxes,  quotas  and,  in extreme  situations,  export
prohibitions.
Variable  import  levies or similarly named  mechanisms  which  bridge the difference  between  some
predetermined threshold  price and the  lower international price for a commodity.
Variable import levies have been abolished and tariffs increased for affected products in 1995  under
these countries' Uruguay Round GATT  commitments.
5OECD,  1994, page  116.
Source: Hartell and Swinnen (1998)
90Table 3 :  Most important land reform  procedures  in CEECs  (*)
COLLECTIVE  FARMLAND  STATE  FARMLAND  a
Procedure  % of TAL  Procedure  % of TAL
Albania  Distribution (physical)  76  Distribution  (physical)  24
Bulgaria  Restitution  72  Miscellaneousd  9
Czech Republic  Restitution  61  Sale (leasing)  25
East Germany  Restitution  82  Sale (leasing)  7
Hungary  Restitution + distribut.  (phys.)  70  Sale  for compensation  12
+ sale for compens.  Bonds f  bonds
Latvia  Restitution  57  + sale  (leasing)  38
Lithuania  Restitution  62  Restitution  30
Poland-  4  Restitution  19
Romania  Restitution + distribut.  (phys.)  58  Sale (leasing)  28
Russia  Distribution  in shares g '  h  40  Undecidede + Restitution  58
Slovakia  Restitution  71  Distribution  in shares g  15
Slovenia-  0  Sale (leasingc)  17
Ukraine  Distribution  in shares g  n.a.  Restitution  n.a.
Distribution  in shares g
(*)  Special procdures for marginal amounts of land are not included  in the table.
a  Excluding  research  farms which  are nowhere  privatized.
b  Farm workers received vouchers in  newly established joint ventures.  However,  as most  of
these joint ventures failled, farm workers received first user rights and  eventually full  property rights.
d  Land is leased to individuals or entities pending sale.
d  In  Bulgaria, the distinction between  state and  collective farms is more  complicated than  in
other CEECs  because the creation,  and later abolishment,  of the so-called Agro-Industrial
Complexes.  Part of the land classified  under "state farmland"  is restituted,  because it was initially
collective farmland  and has a similar status;  another part will not be privatized, and  another part is
the land  on which  large pig and  poultry entreprises  are built and which will be privatized separately.
e  The  Romanian  government  has not decided how to privatize the state farms,  including the
land, on two-thirds of the state farmland.
f  Each  of the land  reform  procedures  applies to approximately  one-third  of the  collective
farmland.
g  Distribution of collective and state farmland equally per capita among  collective farm
members  or state farm employees in the form  of paper shares or certificates. Outsiders who are  not
entitled to land shares can receive land for private farming from  a special state  reserve established
for this purpose (15-20%  of TAL).
h Private ownership is prohibited in 10 ethnic republics of the Russian  Federation.
Source  Swinnen  (1997)





























°  The  FII  is  calculated  by  dividing  the  difference  between  the  share  of  individual  farms  in  total
agricultural land  in  1995  (IND95)  and  in  1989  (IND89)  by  100  minus  the share  of individual  farms  in
total  agricultural  land  in  1989:  FII=(IND95-1ND89)/(100-1ND89)x100.  Data  on  land  use  are  derived
from  a  series  of  country  studies  in  the  EU-COST-network  "Agricultural  Privatisation,  Land  Reform
and Farm  Restructuring  in  Central and  Easternm  Europe",  and  Lerman  (1997),  all reported  in  Swinnen,
Buckwell  and  Mathijs  (1997).  For  all  FSU  countries  except  the  Baltic  countries,  an  initial  share  of
individual farms  equal to 1 percent is assumed.
* 1994.
Source:  Mathijs and  Swinnen  (1998)
9  In previous  papers  we  have  used  the  terms "decollectivization  index" and  "individual  farm  index"
instead  of  "farm individualization  index",  while  using  the  same  (mathematical)  definition.  Following
suggestions  and  comments  by  Zvi  Lerman,  Allan  Buckwell  and  Sofia  Davidova,  we think  that  farm
individualization is  a  more accurate  term  for describing  the  process  measured  by  this  variable.  We
























(*)  Averages for seven CEECs  (Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovakia,
and  Slovenia)  and  nine  commodities  (wheat,  barley,  maize,  sugarbeet,  rapeseed,  milk,  beef  and
veal,  pork,  poultrymeat),  weighted  by  the  share  of  the  commodity  in  output,  but  unweighted  by
countries.  Nominal  protection  rates  (NPR  =  (pd.pb)/pb  where  pd  is the  domestic  producer  price  in
current  US$  evaluated  at  the  official  exchange  rate,  and  pb  is  the  border(reference  price)  are
measured  at nominal  exchange rates;  RPR is the  real  protection  rate (RPR  =  (pd*.pb)/pb where  pd*
is the  domestic producer price  in  US$  evaluated  at the  "adjusted  exchange  rate",  assumed  to  equal
the nominal exchange rate  in  1993);  ExPR  (=RPR-NPR)  measures the  difference between  RPR and
NPR  and  reflects  the  impact  of  divergences  between  domestic  and  international  inflation  and
exchange  rate adjustments.
Source: Bojnec and  Swinnen  (1997).
Figure  2: Relationship between  the increase  in individual farming  during
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GAO  per  farm  worker  (1989)
(*)  Pre-reform  labour
productivity  is  measured  as  gross  agricultural  output  (GAO)  per  farm  workers;  GAO  is  1989
production  (FAO  data)  in  US  dollar  weighted  by  1995  prices.  The  increase  in  individual  farms  is
measured  by the farm  individualization index (FII),  calculated  as in table  4.  The  curve  on  the  graph
is based on a least squares regression  after a logarithmic transformation of GAO/farm  worker.
Source:  Mathijs  and Swinnen  (1998).
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